How are we supposed to feel about Kyrgyzstan?

On April 7, I was putting the finishing touches on a story for the May issue of the Washington Diplomat about the status of the “color and flower revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan moving into the new decade and the extent to which each of the new regimes had disappointed in different ways.

Then the Kyrgyz government raised utility prices on residents by 200 percent, which was apparently the final straw for a people that had endured five years of broken promises, ineffective governance and increasing repression. Before the Kyrgyz opposition could rally together protestors, people were already out in force breaking police riot lines, ransacking government buildings and beating any government officials they could find.

“Damnit. Now I have to rewrite the whole Kyrgyzstan section.”

A week later, I have filed article and the world still seems to be trying to figure out how we should be feeling about this interim government that took power by not-so-peaceful methods over a not-so-great incumbent leader.

Now that ousted Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has safely resigned and exiled himself there is little fear of a civil war in the near future and both Washington and Moscow seem eager to work with the new guys. But why?

Just last June, when the Honduran military arrested Honduran President Manuel Zalaya on the order of the nation’s Supreme Court and instated a politician from Zalaya’s party in his place, the U.N. and most international governments fiercely condemned the act as a coup d’etat, despite acknowledging it was provoked by Zalaya attempting an illegal overreach of power. The interim government remains in power and no nation has recognized it. Still, no one was killed in the incident, whereas in Kyrgyzstan, government officials were killed, beaten and taken hostage, and the overall the violence left more than 80 people dead.

So what is the difference between that bloodless coup in Central America and this violent one in Central Asia?

First of all: Bakiyev was no Zalaya. While Zalaya was unpopular in the United States for his socialist policies similar to those instituted by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, he was the undisputed democratically elected leader of the country.

Bakiyev, on the other hand, despite having come to power with public support following fraudulent elections in 2005 rigged by former President Askar Akayev, he quickly dashed any hopes that he was a man of the people by gradually seizing control of the country’s media and enriching himself and his family through widespread corruption.

As resisting politicians and independent journalists started popping up dead across the country it was clear that Kyrgyz politics hadn’t changed for the better, which is also why the not-so-peaceful methods of uprising get a pass as well. With the amount of peaceful protests that were violently put down, and the growing number of opposition leaders and journalists being assassinated, it was getting ridiculous to expect people to peacefully march in the streets and get gunned down as a means of changing the government.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and Russia didn’t really care that it was getting to that point.

Kyrgyzstan, while having almost no domestic industry to speak of, is strategically placed for American and Russian interests, and is the only country in the world to host a military base for both nations on its soil. For the U.S., this base, though highly unpopular among Kyrgyz citizens, is particularly important for the West as it provides the safest means of supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan.

Although the democratic movements in Georgia and Ukraine prompted Western governments and NGO’s to begin working with both countries to improve their governance and strengthen their democratic institutions, a high-ranking official in a pro-Western NGO operating in the former Soviet Union told me this process was largely ignored in Kyrgyzsan. The priority, he said, was getting the Kyrgyz government to “permit the United States to pursue its interests within their borders,” — meaning the base — and all the Western political and economic capital was poured into keeping the Kyrgyz government from giving into pressure from Russia and the Kyrgyz public to boot the Americans out of the country.

Recently, however, even Russia was getting uncomfortable with the Bakiyev government and had begun giving moral support to the disorganized Kyrgyz opposition in recent months. Once Kyrgyz Interim President Roza Otunbayeva emerged as the national leader, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was reportedly the first head of state to call her. Clinton followed suit not much later.

Otunbayeva is described as a shrewd and worldly politician, but it is far to early to judge either her commitment to democratic principles or her ability to effectively lead the fractious Central Asian nation. She has, however, assuaged the West’s principle concern by assuring the U.S. that the Manas air base deal will be extended beyond the end of its lease in July.

But, the major worry outside of Kyrgyzstan is how this precedent will effect countries in similar situations.

Firebrand opposition leaders in Georgia have already upped the rhetoric following controversial statements by Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili. Pro-Russian opposition leader Zurab Nogaideli said Merabishvili may pay “with his life” if upcoming Tbilisi mayoral elections show signs of fraud, and promised a “Bishkek [the Kyrgyz capital] scenario” if the results to not satisfy him.

While Nogaideli enjoys little popular support, Georgians say they worry about America’s warm reaction to a perceived pro-Russian coup in their neighborhood. While speaking on a panel discussing Ron Asmus’ book “a Little War That Shook the World” Thursday about the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Georgian international law expert Tina Khidasheli expressed her fear that should a similar violent uprising occur in Georgia, headlines across the West would be dominated only by the question, “what will happen with Georgia’s 1,000 troops in Afghanistan?” and Western interest would stop there.