New START Treaty: a semi-enthusiastic “… yay.”

Sadly it seems like the Obama administration’s new standard war cry for policy is “Something is Better than Nothing!”

Speaking at the United States Institute of Peace  in Washington, DC July 26, State Department officials could hardly contain their enthusiasm for the START arms reduction treaty with Russia, saying, “the United States is better off with this Treaty than without it.”

Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, courtesy of state.gov

Strong words, Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, strong words.

She is right, of course, but considering many U.S. senators, who have yet to ratify the treaty, maintain serious doubts about it, you would expect a bit of a bolder sales pitch than “this washing machine probably won’t make your life worse.”

Nevermind that all but one commander of U.S. strategic nuclear command from 1981 to 2004 signed a letter to the Senate endorsing the treaty, Senate Republicans still love our nukes and hate the Ruskies.

Well, in this case they do actually have reason for suspicion.

According to a State Department report made public today, it’s not entirely clear Russia has complied with past arms reduction treaties.

The document says the U.S. government does not believe Russia is in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention because it has not declared all its stockpiles nor destroyed those it has acknowledged, despite a 1997 plan to do so.

The report also says Russia may not be in compliance with the international convention banning biological weapons. Russia committed in 1992 to dismantle a secret biological weapons program it inherited from the Soviet Union. Although Russia has said it is in compliance, it has “not satisfactorily documented whether this program was terminated,” according to the report.

Frankly, having dealt with the Russian government before, I have to say that a lack of proper paperwork doesn’t necessarily mean conspiracy, it usually just means inefficiency and laziness, but still, this new information doesn’t help make the case that we should voluntarily dismantle and demobilize a significant portion of our nuclear arsenal on the assumption the Russia will do the same.

But, since the old START I Treaty expired last December, the only way for us to have any type of agreement with the Russians that allows us to verify they are not increasing their active nuclear deployments is to sign a new treaty, even if it isn’t perfect.

“The new Treaty provides for an annual quota of 18 on-site inspections a year. While this is less than the number permitted under START (28), the number of Russian facilities that are eligible for inspection will be 35, which is half the 70 total former Soviet facilities that were subject to inspection under START. And, of course, the number of inspections without the New START Treaty is and will be zero,” Gottemoeller said.

“Its comprehensive verification regime will provide predictability, but it recognizes that we are no longer in a Cold War relationship. Thus, it allows each Party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms and how reductions will be made,” she continued.

Where the treaty is lacking on enforcement, it does theoretically decommission a lot more nuclear weapons, reducing each side’s deployed ICBM’s from 2,200 to 1,550, and places limits on other delivery systems. However, given the amount of military hardware we are talking about and the limited nature of the inspections, this agreement does seem pretty cosmetic.

Still, something is better than nothing. I guess.