Saakashvili celebrates victory over Russia

Saakashvili meets with Georgian troops at the Krstanisi military base in February.

Apparently I missed a rather odd weekend in Tbilisi.

Throughout the region, local journalists and politicians mark August 7-8 on their calendar for the usual stories and statements about the anniversary of the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. The political leaders of Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia snipe and grandstand and journalists write up something quick about where the two sides stand today.

I didn’t stay for the fireworks and instead marked the war’s birthday by trekking my way through Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park in central Georgia.

Surprisingly, what I missed in Tbilisi was, indeed, fireworks.

This year’s anniversary was quieter than the previous when Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili pulled out all the stops to commemorate the biggest blunder of his presidency. A year ago, a Soviet-era armored vehicle blocked off Rustaveli Avenue in downtown Tbilisi (to symbolize Russia, I guess) and Georgian officials stood around a “unity bonfire” in Gori, a city that was heavily bombed during the war. This year the festivities came from the broadcast media, where the president delivered message of victory, echoing a statement he had made earlier in the week.

“Moreover, not only the enemy failed to subdue Georgia… on the contrary, Georgia as disobedient nation, has turned into a symbol of success for all post-Soviet states and that’s contrary to what the enemy planned… That’s a historic process, which will be followed by irreversible dismantling of old imperia and imperial sphere of influence,” he said.

Fireworks lit up the Tbilisi sky I was told. One of my Georgian fellow hikers in Borjomi received a text from an exasperated friend in Tbilisi, “Don’t turn on the TV.”

It is sad to me how Georgia continues to deceive itself in such absurd ways. For Saakashvili’s historic “disobedience” the “symbol of success” lost 20 percent of the country’s total territory in the war, and the biggest share of the blame for that falls on Georgia’s bull-headed policies towards the breakaway republics since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Has Russia been a helpful influence here? Most certainly not. Did they want to topple the Saakashvili regime in 2008? Most certainly so. Were they halted from doing so by the Georgian military? Not even close. Within a couple of days of fighting, the Georgian military was in full retreat, and after testing the international waters, Putin correctly perceived that he could get away with destabilizing one of the West’s favorite little strategically located countries, but there would be serious consequences for a full occupation and regime change.

For that Saakashvili should be gracious, not gloating.

All of that said, looking back on the last two years, the most stunning thing is how Saakashvili has remained in control. After the war, he appeared dead in the water. The opposition shut down central Tbilisi for months with sit-in protests aimed at forcing his resignation, a coup attempt was foiled and Russian troops poured into the territory of their newly recognized allies — Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

And yet, he survived. The protests lost steam, and the opposition itself lost all credibility as it failed not only to dislodge Saakashvili, but also failed to form an organized coalition or even a clear message for why they were a better choice than the incumbent. The threat of Russian intervention died down as Obama and Putin “reset” the Bush-era acrimony back to levels of mistrust that were unlikely to end up in proxy wars.

In fact, not only has Saakashvili survived, he is soaring. His poll numbers are up, his party won big in May’s local elections, and he’s about to sign constitutional reform that will allow him to follow the same playbook as his nemesis, Vladimir Putin — step down when his presidential term limit is up only to take a spot as the prime minister in a new government that gives this new position more power, and, of course, no term limits.

People who work closely with Saakashvili’s inner circle tell me that “the existential threat of Russia” is the driving force behind these authoritarian moves and, thanks largely to pro-government media, the public agrees.

The opposition has been painted as pro-Russian and Saakashvili himself can hardly utter two words publicly without dramatically illustrating all the Russian guns pointed at Georgia’s head. Georgia continues to slide down the lists on levels of democracy and free press, and Saakashvili has made himself out to be the only trustworthy politician the nation has to offer.

Looking back at the last two years it is clear there was a Georgian winner in the August war. But it wasn’t the Georgian people at large, or the future of the nation. Mikheil Saakashvili won, Georgia lost.